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Abstract: Mark Blaug played a central role in the development of the 
field of the methodology of economics, alongside his theoretical work 
and contributions to the history of economic thought. The purpose, in 
this article, is to focus on his contributions to the topic of ‘formalism   
in economics’, in relation to his methodological commentaries on       
the Popperian and Lakatosian approaches to the philosophy of science. 
In Blaugian spirit, the discussion is related to economic theory and 
draws on the history of economic thought. The argument focuses on  
the troublesome interface between theoretical and applied economics   
in mainstream economics. The article includes, as a case study, an 
assessment of new behavioural economics in Popperian and Lakatosian 
terms. The conclusion is that such an appraisal exercise—i.e., whether 
the research programme is progressive or degenerative—is clouded by 
the interface between the form of empiricism promoted by Popper and 
Lakatos and the methodological framework of mainstream economics. 
No conclusion is feasible independent of methodological approach. 
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Mark Blaug was well known both for his promotion of a 
Popperian/Lakatosian approach to the methodology of economics     
and for his critique of mathematical formalism. While his thinking 
evolved over the years—as you would expect for such a subtle thinker 
and prodigiously-well-read scholar—these were consistent themes over 
his long years of leading and contributing to thinking on methodology. 
Blaug’s stance directly addressed the emergence of a juxtaposition 
during the twentieth century between two conflicting trends in 
DOW / FORMALISM, RATIONALITY, AND EVIDENCE 
ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 27 
economics: on the one hand the idea that theory should be appraised by 
reference to the evidence, and on the other hand a form of theory  
which eluded definitive direct testing. Furthermore, of the two trends it 
was the second which had become increasingly dominant in economics.  
In addition to Blaug’s philosophical interest, this juxtaposition has 
attracted particular attention in the field of experimental economics  
and its relations with new behavioural economics. The empirical results 
of experimental economics at times seem to falsify key elements of pure 
theory in mainstream economics. Yet, amending theory in order to take 
this into account, particularly with input from psychology, has run up 
against the strictures of mathematical formalism. 
In the Preface to the second edition of The methodology of economics 
(1992 [1980]), Blaug notes that he had contemplated adding material   
on new developments in economics, such as experimental economics. 
But he had decided against this, based on his “disinclination to rush     
in where angels fear to tread” (Blaug 1992, xii). Still this is what—with 
some trepidation—is proposed for the present contribution.  
The financial crisis has provided new impetus to behavioural 
economics, in the search for an explanation for events which would 
seem to constitute massive falsifying evidence to a body of theory  
which presumed markets to be efficient and equilibrating. In this article, 
we will consider the extent to which new behavioural economics 
satisfies the Lakatosian criterion for a progressive research programme, 
namely the capacity to predict novel facts. More generally, we will 
consider how far the developing field of behavioural economics 
addresses Blaug’s critique of formalism in mainstream economics. 
In what follows, a brief account will be given of Blaug’s 
Popperian/Lakatosian methodology in relation to his views on the 
formalisation of economic theory. We will then explore the tensions 
which have persisted in mainstream economics between pure theory 
and applied economics. In considering how mainstream economics    
has evolved in recent decades—including paying more attention to 
experimental evidence which seems to shed light on the financial 
crisis—we will draw on Blaug’s views about economic rationality; a 
notion which is central to the evolution of new behavioural economics. 
We will then consider the methodological issues surrounding 
experiments in economics and how far the use of experimental evidence 
addresses Blaug’s critique of mainstream economics. 
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BLAUG’S POPPERIAN METHODOLOGY 
Blaug’s methodological position is summed up by him in the final 
sentences of both editions of his Methodology of economics:  
 
the ultimate question we can and indeed must pose about any 
research program is the one made familiar by Popper: what events, if 
they materialized, would lead us to reject that program? A program 
that cannot meet that question has fallen short of the highest 
standards that scientific knowledge can attain (Blaug 1992, 248).1 
 
One of the hallmarks of Blaug’s methodology was his espousal        
of falsificationism. Blaug observed that economists paid lip-service to 
falsificationism while practising verificationism when seeking empirical 
support for theoretical conclusions. Blaug’s criticism of the disparity 
between what economists said they were doing and what they were 
actually doing was a contribution in itself, to which we will return below. 
Blaug was careful not to espouse naïve falsificationism, being well 
aware of the ambiguities of testing procedures such as the Duhem-
Quine problem. Any hypothesis being tested incorporates a collection  
of sub-hypotheses, both theoretical and in terms of mathematical 
expression and selection of data. It is therefore difficult to identify what 
precisely has been falsified by an empirical test. Popper himself had 
been well aware of these ambiguities, proposing a series of conventions 
for good scientific practice to discourage ‘immunising stratagems’ which 
would allow scientists to maintain theories in the face of falsifying 
evidence. Ambiguities in testing also result from the openness of 
physical systems with respect to observation. Popper (1982) argued   
that the process of observation was performative, itself changing the 
physical world; he gives the example of the drawing of a map of          
the world, which by being created changes the physical reality the map 
is designed to represent. Like Popper, Blaug was not a purist: “we want 
to gain knowledge of the world, even if it is only fallible knowledge” 
(Blaug 1992, 20). Nevertheless he was adamant that, for theory to         
be worth having, it had to be able to stand up to empirical evidence, 
which also meant that it could fall by evidence. 
                                                 
1 Richard Lipsey recalls that—in conversation—Mark Blaug said he would be happy 
with a less stringent but more tractable requirement, namely that economists             
be prepared to specify what evidence would conflict with their theories (it being a 
necessary condition for a theory to have empirical content that it not be consistent 
with all possible observations). 
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But the practice of verificationism had been given some 
methodological respectability by Lakatos (1970), who sanctioned 
disregard of contrary evidence on ‘infant-industry’ grounds as theory 
was developed, as well as appearing to sanction the protection of   
‘hard-core’ principles from testing. Similarly, Blaug discusses how 
Popper himself allowed for degrees of corroboration (rather than           
a dualistic divide between falsification and verification). Blaug saw      
the subsequent popularity of Kuhnian ideas as an extreme version of 
this—a complete relativism, without any extra-paradigmatic criteria for 
appraisal. Blaug (1992, 42-47) was quite explicit that his methodological 
position was monist—it was possible and desirable to establish one best 
set of standards for appraisal. He thus lauded Lakatos’s criterion of 
appraisal: the capacity to predict novel facts (see further Blaug 1991).  
 
THE RISE OF FORMALISM IN NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
Blaug maintained his critique of economics as not following Popper’s 
proposed conventions for robust empirical testing. But the different 
problem of the absence of testing altogether increasingly became the 
focus of this criticism. By formalism Blaug meant the prioritising of the 
form of a theory over its content. That form need not be mathematical, 
although that is the formalism most evident in mainstream economics 
(Blaug 1999, 258). Where Blaug gave the highest priority to empirical 
appraisal—through which theories might be rejected—formalists 
normally treat empirical testing merely as something which might be 
done in principle or—in the extreme—as irrelevant (see Hahn 1981). 
Blaug (1999) charted the rise of formalism in mainstream economics in 
the second half of the twentieth century. General equilibrium theory,     
a particular type of formalism, had come to dominate the discipline.     
It employed a deductivist mathematical approach, built on a set of 
axioms concerning rational individual economic behaviour.  
During this period, theorising and testing were increasingly being 
treated as separate activities, in spite of Popper’s proposed conventions 
(Blaug 1999). Popper had argued for theorising to evolve by a process of 
conjecture and refutation, i.e., of testing successive narrow hypotheses 
against facts, with the outcome influencing the formulation of future 
conjectures. While formalism had encouraged ever more reductionism in 
general equilibrium theory, the axioms were taken to be self-evidently 
true. Further, any testing of propositions deduced from the axioms was 
riddled with the Duhem-Quine problem. If the data appeared to falsify 
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the theory, what exactly had been falsified? Indeed it was difficult        
to discriminate between theories empirically, allowing the dominance of 
formal theory to persist.  
Rational expectations theory addressed this bifurcation head on     
by defining all actual states as equilibrium states. Hence, not only did 
economists engage in empirical estimation and prediction with respect 
to formal theory, but so, effectively, did economic agents as well. While 
Sargent in particular struggled to deal with the circularity involved in 
this idea, the logical issues were never resolved in such a way that the 
theory would meet the deductivist-axiomatic requirements of general 
equilibrium formalism as well as the empirical estimation procedures 
that were internal to the theory and the basis for prediction (Sent 1998). 
While apparently falsificationist, the approach was never overtly 
dropped on the basis of its unimpressive prediction record, although    
it was not pursued further. Nevertheless, rational expectations remain 
embedded in mainstream macroeconomic theory. 
But more recently there has been a different type of confrontation 
between pure theory and applied work. The rationality principle 
(constrained optimisation based on the rationality axioms), and thus  
the formalist structure itself, have been the subject of empirical 
challenge by experimental evidence. Blaug (1992, 232-233) noted that 
the anomalies which arose from experimental evidence had been widely 
dismissed as random perturbations at the micro level. But this is no 
longer the case. Since then the body of experimental evidence has grown 
considerably, as has the body of theory in new behavioural economics—
to be distinguished from the old behavioural economists (see Sent 2004). 
A major impetus has been the financial and economic crisis, an event 
which could reasonably be regarded as an anomaly on a grand scale.     
It had proved difficult to settle the empirical status of the efficient 
markets hypothesis and subjective expected utility theory (for reasons 
encapsulated by the Duhem-Quine problem) but the crisis added weight 
to those who questioned their validity. In particular, aggregative 
evidence from financial markets suggested that there were systematic 
deviations from the results implied by the efficient markets hypothesis, 
which was founded on the rationality principle (Shiller 2000). These 
deviations could be explained by psychological factors for which 
experimental evidence provided support. Akerlof (2002) generalised  
this approach to behavioural macroeconomics. 
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Blaug (1992, 233) had concluded that, while only a naïve 
falsificationist would abandon the mainstream approach purely on     
the grounds of such anomalies, abandonment was made possible         
by such alternatives as prospect theory and Herbert Simon’s notion of 
bounded rationality. The implication was that there might be a new 
progressive research programme in the making. But there has also been 
a process of retrenchment (which could be classified as immunising 
stratagems) as mainstream economists have attempted to explain the 
crisis in terms of constraints on the operation of an equilibrating 
market system (restrictions on competition, asymmetric information, 
and/or distorted incentives). Even among behavioural economists there 
has been a reluctance to depart significantly from the standard 
framework. Camerer and his colleagues introduce their substantial 
behavioural economics reader as follows:  
 
At the core of behavioral economics is the conviction that increasing 
the realism of the psychology underlying economic analysis will 
improve the field of economics on its own terms—generating 
theoretical insights, making better predictions of field phenomena, 
and suggesting better policy. This conviction does not imply a 
wholesale rejection of the neoclassical approach to economics based 
on utility maximization, equilibrium, and efficiency. The neoclassical 
approach is useful because it provides economists with a theoretical 
framework that can be applied to almost any form of economic (and 
even noneconomic) behavior, and it makes refutable predictions 
(Camerer, et al. 2004, 1; emphasis in the original). 
 
Yet Berg and Gigerenzer (2010, 134) criticise new behavioural 
economics precisely for retaining the standard framework, highlighting 
the consequent ‘very partial commitments to empirical realism’. In what 
follows we consider how far new behavioural economics comes up to 
Blaug’s methodological empirical realist standards. We consider this 
question in terms of the tension in mainstream economics between 
empirical testing and formalism. 
 
NEW BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS  
We have seen that new behavioural economics introduced psychology 
into economics on the realist grounds that there was evidence              
of behaviour which deviated from what was assumed in standard 
mainstream theory, that is, empirical anomalies. But to satisfy Blaug’s 
criteria we want to see: a) that the response to these anomalies was 
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theoretical developments which are not just ad hoc adjustments, b) the 
capacity to predict novel facts or provide novel explanations, c) an 
abductive approach to theorising such that theoretical developments are 
driven by reference to evidence, and d) an indication of what would 
cause behavioural economists to reject their own theories. How far   
does it live up to Camerer and his colleagues’ (2004) own promise of 
generating refutable predictions, that is, to falsificationism? 
Although not all of this evidence was experimental, and not all 
experimental economics feeds into behavioural economics, there is 
nevertheless a significant overlap between the two (see Sent 2004).   
This inter-relationship was reflected in the award of the 2002         
Nobel prize jointly to Kahneman for his contributions to behavioural 
economics and to Smith for his contributions to experimental 
economics. The experimental evidence appeared to falsify either the 
rationality axioms or the presumption of optimising behaviour which 
formed part of the hard core of the mainstream research programme. 
Conventionally, as part of the hard core, the rationality principle  
had been regarded as being exempt from falsification; rationality could 
be regarded as a metaphysical principle. While Popper saw theory as 
being built on conjectures rather than axioms, he had supported        
this exemption from testing for the rationality principle, allowing a 
significant element of commonality between Popper and Lakatos when it 
came to economics. Blaug (1992, 231) explained such a surprising stance 
in terms of Popper’s lack of understanding of the significance of the 
rationality principle for economics. Further, he argued that Popper had 
not appreciated the significance of the auxiliary hypotheses attached   
to the assumption of rationality (such as full information) which were 
adopted to make the principle theoretically tractable. 
But what does the experimental evidence signify? Some have argued 
that definitive empirical tests of the rationality axioms are not feasible 
(Blaug 1992, 231). If tested by means of experiments, the results    
would be ambiguous because of the Duhem-Quine problem. It would   
be impossible to test the rationality principle independently of 
assumptions about the stability of preferences, for example. But over 
the last decade experimental economics has become increasingly 
sophisticated in devices (such as double-blind experiments) to ensure 
that the hypotheses being tested are sufficiently narrow and precise, 
and the tests themselves so well-organised in efforts to yield clear 
results, that they can be said to adhere to Popper’s proposals for dealing 
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with the Duhem-Quine problem (see, e.g., Berg, et al. 2005). In particular, 
efforts have been made in designing experiments to isolate individuals 
from social interaction in order to observe self-interested individualistic 
behaviour. 
But such a stratagem may be interpreted in terms of too much 
isolation. The intention is to make the experiments accord more 
precisely to the theoretical framework based on methodological 
individualism and the rationality principle, but that means the 
experiments are not reflecting evidence of actual behaviour in             
the different framework of reality (see further Hargreaves Heap 2009). 
If, for example, individuals are in fact other-regarding, then it is          
not clear how experimental conclusions about isolated behaviour can 
explain actual behaviour. Some experimental evidence (as in the 
ultimatum game) indicates an other-regarding aspect of individual 
behaviour which can be taken as falsifying evidence with respect to    
the standard rationality axioms, and also as limiting the relevance        
of evidence based on experiments designed to abstract from other-
regarding behaviour. Other-regarding behaviour—in the form of mass 
psychology or herd behaviour—provides an important behavioural 
explanation for the financial crisis (see, e.g., Kirman 2011). 
Others have pointed to logical problems in interpreting  
experimental evidence which aims to identify deviations from a rational 
optimising benchmark. For example, the presumption that agents 
rationally optimise on information in order to rationally optimise in 
choice situations has been shown to collapse in an infinite regress 
(Winter 1964; Cohen and Dickens 2002). More generally, Berg and 
Gigerenzer (2010) classify rational optimisation as ‘as-if’ behaviour, and 
call into question the validity of interpreting experimental evidence   
and results with respect to a framework where significant ‘as-if’ 
assumptions are retained. Taking prospect theory as an example, they 
point to its limited departure from the standard framework in that     
the experiments presume that risks can be quantified and manipulated 
in a sophisticated way. These presumptions about the capacity for 
knowledge appear to be logically inconsistent with the behavioural 
theory that agents employ heuristics in order to cope with cognitive 
limitations (see Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). Such limitations were a core element of Simon’s (1955) earlier 
development of the concept of bounded rationality.  
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Cognitive limitations are an important feature of behavioural 
economics explanations for behaviour which appears to be other-
regarding even in a methodologically-individualistic framework. But in 
fact much of behavioural economics retains the individual rationality 
framework. Thus, for example, individual behaviour may be like herd 
behaviour, but only in the sense of putting undue emphasis on past 
trends (Bikhchandani and Sharma 2001). Shiller’s (2000) feedback theory 
uses the rationality framework as a benchmark for classifying such 
behaviour as irrational. Similarly, instability in the real economy may be 
seen as the result of financial instability (exaggerated amplitude of asset 
price deviations) which arises from self-fulfilling beliefs, confusingly 
dubbed ‘animal spirits’. This literature explains such beliefs in terms of 
Keynes’s ‘beauty contest model’ of expectations formation. But, even if 
expectations deviate from what rationality would predict, the individual 
decision-maker is depicted as forming optimal expectations given 
cognitive limitations. In any case, for some contributors, the nature and 
role of cognitive limitations are peripheral to the explanation of 
financial instability. The important explanatory factor is an exogenous 
disturbance to beliefs, which can just as easily be explained by sunspots 
(see, e.g., Farmer and Guo 2004). Retaining the basic rational choice 
framework is given priority over the explanation of actual behaviour. 
The input of psychology into behavioural economics also takes the 
form of specifying unconventional preferences to which rational choice 
is applied. Thus, within representative agent models in prospect theory, 
for example, scope is given for unconventional preferences such as   
loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This explains behaviour 
which otherwise appears to be irrational. Similarly, heterogeneous agent 
models may allow for different groups of market participants with 
different preferences. In particular, non-professionals may be guided by 
sentiment, while professional arbitrageurs are guided by rationality. 
Instability may emerge if sentiment drives markets in a particular 
direction, although arbitrageurs will normally ensure a return to 
equilibrium (Baker and Wurgler 2007). But, as advocated by Robbins 
(1932), the source of preferences is not explored; it is taken as given  
(see further Binmore and Shaked 2007). 
 
PROGRESSIVE OR DEGENERATING RESEARCH PROGRAMMES 
As Sent (2004) argues, what distinguished new behavioural economics 
from old behavioural economics is that the reference point for the 
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former is always the standard rational-choice framework. Where old 
behavioural economists absorbed the evidence of deviations from       
the rational-choice model and developed an alternative framework 
accordingly, new behavioural economists accepted the rational-choice 
framework as their hard core, but amended its auxiliary hypotheses     
by modifying models to allow for (limited) cognitive limitations and 
unconventional preferences (Earl 2010). As Kahneman (2003, 1469)    
put it: “Theories in behavioural economics have generally retained the 
basic architecture of the rational model, adding assumptions about 
cognitive limitations designed to account for specific anomalies”. 
Further, anything which cannot be explained in terms of rationality       
is dualistically classified as irrationality (Altman 2004). This is clearly 
shown by Akerlof and Shiller (2009); the behavioural explanations they 
offer for evidence which challenges mainstream theory explicitly refer to 
such behaviour as either ‘irrational’ or ‘non-economic’. The Lakatosian 
framework thus seems to be successful in providing a good account of 
new behavioural economics as protecting the hard core rationality 
principle. But, while this may have helped in communicating new 
behavioural economics ideas to mainstream economists, it leaves 
behavioural economics without its own coherent theoretical foundation 
(Cohen and Dickens 2002). 
How well does new behavioural economics stack up in terms of 
Lakatos’s appraisal criteria of predicting novel facts and avoiding ad hoc 
adjustments? There has been a range of critiques of new behavioural 
economics on the grounds that it can provide ex post explanations for 
behaviour, but falls short on prediction (see, e.g., Binmore and Shaked 
2007). Similarly, Cohen and Dickens introduce their argument for an 
alternative theoretical framework (evolutionary psychology) as follows, 
 
the policy influence of [behavioural economics] is limited by its 
inability to predict circumstances in which anomalous behavior    
will arise (other than in those sorts of circumstances in which it has 
been observed before) or how it will respond to policy changes 
(Cohen and Dickens 2002, 335).  
 
They then proceed to discuss bounded rationality as an ad hoc 
adjustment. 
Mark Blaug (1992) encourages consideration of whether a research 
programme is progressive or degenerating by means of comparison. As 
Backhouse (1991, 412) points out, a novel fact could be understood as a 
DOW / FORMALISM, RATIONALITY, AND EVIDENCE 
VOLUME 6, ISSUE 3 (SPECIAL ISSUE), WINTER 2013 36 
new explanation of an existing fact. Thus, while the financial crisis       
as experienced from 2007 was not a novel event, new behavioural 
economics provided a new explanation. But in mainstream economics it 
was only novel to analyse financial crises as systemic with reference to 
expectations formation and decision making. Other approaches already 
offered this kind of explanation, inviting direct comparison between 
new behavioural economics and these alternative explanations. It is 
crucial that these alternative explanations arose from different 
methodological frameworks, so direct comparison as advocated by 
Blaug is impossible. Not only are there different criteria for judging 
what is a novel fact and what is a satisfactory explanation, but different 
meanings are ascribed to both concepts and evidence (see Dow 2012, 
chapter 1). 
As an example of an alternative explanation, old behavioural 
economics already had well-developed theories of decision-making 
based on satisficing rather than optimising and using heuristics in order 
to address cognitive limitations—most of which is precluded by the 
mainstream rational optimising framework. Berg and Gigerenzer (2010) 
draw attention particularly to the incompatibility between the gross 
substitution assumption of the mainstream framework and the adoption 
of lexicographic preferences, for which there is substantial evidence. 
The concept of bounded rationality spawned a rich and complex body  
of thought among old behavioural economists (Fiore 2011). As another 
example, post-Keynesian economics already had a macroeconomic 
theory of financial instability which combined a theory of uncertainty 
(only partly due to cognitive limitations) with a theory of financial 
structure (Minsky 1982). This theory could not predict the timing of the 
financial crisis, but did account for how financial fragility was increasing 
in the years leading up to 2007 creating the conditions for a crisis. Both 
approaches are logically consistent. The limitations to knowledge which 
underpin the core concepts of both bounded rationality and uncertainty 
are incorporated into an open-system understanding of social systems. 
Rather than being calculative optimisers, agents cope by adopting 
heuristics, adopting conventional knowledge, following conventional 
behaviour in practices and routines (which are not necessarily sensible), 
and satisficing. In this way, theory is consistent with its ontological   
and epistemological foundations, which contrasts with the internal 
consistency criterion within a deductivist mathematical framework. 
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Nevertheless, can the new behavioural economics research 
programme be seen as progressive at least within mainstream 
economics? It addresses anomalies which have been found, not only      
in experimental evidence but also in more conventional econometric 
evidence, with new theories. Thus Rabin and Thaler (2001) challenged 
the subjective expected utility theory with an alternative explanation for 
risk aversion which accorded more with the experimental evidence. 
Shiller (2000) had identified excess swings in asset prices compared to 
what was predicted by the efficient markets hypothesis, and explained 
them in terms of the psychology of information gathering and 
expectations formation: undue emphasis on trends, undue attention     
to media interpretations, and so on. Accordingly he developed feedback 
models to capture this behaviour (see Shiller 2003).  
New behavioural economics includes elements which depart from 
the mainstream framework, as in some authors accepting limitations to 
global rationality (for a cataloguing of similarities and differences,      
see Earl and Peng 2012). Perhaps most tellingly, there is a willingness   
to pursue non-universal explanations, a feature reminiscent of old 
behavioural epistemology. Here we find some inconsistency between 
what new behavioural economists say in terms of adopting the standard 
framework and what they do. This echoes Blaug’s observation that 
mainstream economists behave inconsistently with their professed 
falsificationism. It also echoes McCloskey’s (1983) observation of the 
disparity between the formalist ‘official discourse’ of mainstream 
economics and the pluralist, context-specific ‘unofficial discourse’. 
Lawson (1997) identifies inconsistency too, between the closed-system 
methodology of mainstream economics (which allows for theorising     
in terms of constrained optimisation) and any sense of the openness of 
real social systems. Were new behavioural economists to emphasise 
consistency with their observations of reality over the internal 
consistency (and universality) of the rational optimising framework, 
there would be much more scope for theoretical developments which 
are not ad hoc adjustments to existing theory. But by retaining the hard 
core of mainstream economics in the form of the rationality benchmark, 
even if not rationality itself, new behavioural economics is accepting 
constraints on its scope for progressive development.  
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THE RELATIVE PRIORITISATION OF THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
The insistence on a formalist approach to theory was the subject of 
Blaug’s (1999) critique of mainstream economics. Nowadays more 
attention is being paid to evidence. But as I have shown, the way           
in which the formalist mainstream approach developed, with its 
benchmark of rational optimisation, constrains the way in which theory 
can evolve in response to new evidence.2 Being a deductivist approach, 
the axioms are of critical importance, so any modification requires 
general acceptance (not just local applicability) and feeds through into 
all theoretical results. Either the behavioural approach defines actual 
behaviour as rational by redefining the constraints, or the behaviour is 
redefined as irrational. Then the choice is whether to treat irrational 
behaviour as stochastic, which again does not challenge mainstream 
theory, or to theorise and model it. But how can that be achieved other 
than with a modified set of axioms? And what is more, how can a set of 
axioms incorporate irrationality?  
Modelling heuristics, for example, could be an alternative, however 
some authors have recently reflected on the challenges posed by such 
approach (see, e.g., Goodhart 2008; De Grauwe 2010). More generally, 
there is a problem in trying to incorporate models of irrational 
behaviour into the general deductivist framework. As Blaug (1992, 233) 
points out, if the evidence suggests that behaviour departs from 
rationality in financial markets, then it must be presumed that it does  
so in other markets. This problem stems directly from mainstream 
methodology. A Lakatosian would be concerned at ad hoc adjustments 
such as introducing some constraints on market processes to explain 
anomalies. But within the mainstream framework what is regarded as  
ad hoc are theories which have only very localised application: 
 
The enduring appeal of classical asset-pricing theory over the last 
several decades owes much to its success in forging a consensus 
around a foundational modelling platform. This platform consists  
of a core set of assumptions that have been widely-accepted           
by researchers working in the field as reasonable first-order 
descriptions of investor behaviour, and that—just as importantly—
lend themselves to elegant, powerful, and tractable theorizing. 
If behavioural finance is ever to approach the stature of classical 
asset pricing, it will have to move beyond a large collection of 
                                                 
2 Lawson (2009) and Dow (2012) have focused further on the deductivist, mathematical 
nature of this formalism. 
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empirical facts and competing one-off models, and ultimately reach 
a similar sort of consensus (Hong and Stein 2007, 126). 
 
The appraisal of new behavioural economics is thus conditioned by 
acceptance of the formalist mainstream methodological framework.      
It is this which challenges the value of partial theories which are not 
deterministic and drives the new behavioural economics agenda in the 
direction of ever more general formal theories of behaviour which      
are amenable to mathematical modelling. Within the mainstream 
framework, new behavioural economics would be theoretically 
progressive if it enhanced the existing body of theory by increasing     
its scope. It would be empirically progressive if it addressed evidence of 
anomalies and improved empirical prediction. But there is the potential 
for significant conflict between the two and, within the mainstream 
methodological framework, theoretical progressiveness is prioritised 
over empirical progressiveness. While the development of partial 
theories (feedback theories, prospect theory, and so forth) could be said 
to be empirically progressive, this is incompatible with trying to fit  
such theories into a general equilibrium framework deduced from      
the rationality axioms. As long as new behavioural economics accepts the 
mainstream framework, therefore, it is likely to become degenerative.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This discussion indicates that new behavioural economics falls short in 
Lakatosian terms. It could become a progressive research programme   
if it evolved through partial theories developed in an abductive interplay 
with evidence, an approach favoured by Blaug (1999). This is something 
which already exists in the old behavioural economics, as in Earl, Peng, 
and Potts’s (2007) theory of instability in the housing market due to 
reliance on heuristics. Yet much of the academic success of new 
behavioural economics must be down to its self-presentation in relation 
to the rational optimisation framework (Earl and Peng 2012). 
In making a Lakatosian comparative assessment of alternative 
research programmes, we run up against a meta-methodological 
problem. Considering Lakatos’s prescriptive (as opposed to descriptive) 
framework once we move beyond mainstream economics is problematic 
in that Lakatos’s approach itself is closely aligned with the mainstream 
approach to economics. What constitutes a novel fact (even in the form 
only of a satisfactory new explanation) and what constitutes an ad hoc 
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adjustment depends on the particular understanding of the world, 
interpretation of facts and criteria for good theory (including 
consistency, as discussed above) which distinguish methodological 
frameworks. This was a key feature of Kuhn’s discussion of paradigms 
which was dropped by Lakatos, for whom research programmes       
were directly empirically comparable. Just as the rationality principle    
is metaphysical and thus untestable, so too is the whole mainstream 
framework.  
This problem is also evident when we consider Blaug’s Popperian 
criterion, that economists should specify what evidence would lead 
them to reject a theory. Since theories are part of the complex structure 
of research programmes, which embody a particular understanding of 
and interpretation of reality and of what constitutes good theory, 
rejection ultimately has to be at the metaphysical level. This helps us 
understand the resistance by many economists to respond to the crisis 
by rejecting the mainstream framework (Earl 2010). But for some 
mainstream economists the crisis has shaken confidence in a research 
programme that assumes the capacity of markets to stabilise 
themselves. They are open to alternatives. Similarly, if austerity policies 
in a recession fuelled a supply-side boom then many Keynesians would 
lose confidence in their approach and seek alternatives. But within any 
research programme it is the overall approach which is decisive rather 
than individual theories. The discussion above has illustrated this in   
the case of behavioural economics.  
Our consideration of new behavioural economics addresses Blaug’s 
concern that theoretical appraisal be empirical in relation to his concern 
that too much priority was being placed on theoretical formalism.   
What we have seen is the blossoming of a relatively new area in 
mainstream economics which seems to successfully explain the financial 
crisis. But this is not a new research programme in the Lakatosian sense, 
since the hard core rationality principle was retained. Constraints on  
full information and on rational choice are explained by a more 
sophisticated representation of rationality or else as irrationality.      
This is a change in the protective belt. Nonetheless, there is a pressure 
on developing these theories in such a way as to make them more 
general through greater formalisation, that is, limiting the change to   
the protective belt by ensuring methodological compatibility with the 
mainstream.  
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Genuinely alternative theoretical approaches, such as old 
behavioural economics and post-Keynesian economics, employ different 
methodological frameworks, thus constituting competing Lakatosian, 
research programmes. They adopt different stances with respect to    
the nature and meaning of theory and evidence from mainstream 
economics, but that is only relevant to the current argument inasmuch 
as it raises particular issues with a Lakatosian empirical criterion          
of appraisal.3 These different approaches are identified by different 
understandings of real-world processes and terminology from the 
mainstream research programme, so they have not been recognised    
(or indeed are not recognisable) as progressive from the mainstream 
perspective.  
There is no independent way of making judgements about 
progression or degeneration across research programmes. While            
a Popperian/Lakatosian framework might encourage the idea of an 
empiricist alternative to formalism, we have seen that pure empiricism 
is unsatisfactory. A methodologist cannot be in a position to take        
an independent view on novel facts and ad hoc adjustments. This is not 
at all to say that any interpretation is as good as any other, but rather 
that there is no ultimate independent arbiter and therefore any position 
needs to be justified. Blaug was notably well-informed about and open 
to alternative approaches to economics. This is the best position      
from which to engage in constructive debate as to the merits of 
different theories and theoretical approaches. 
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